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INTRODUCTION: SYMPOSIUM ON RECENT CHANGES
IN THE RULES OF PRETRIAL FACT DEVELOPMENT:
WHAT DO THEY DISCLOSE ABOUT LITIGATION AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION?
Mary P. Twitchell*
At its annual meeting in January 1994, the Association of American
Law School sections on Civil Procedure and Litigation combined forces to
examine recent changes to the federal rules of discovery requiring lawyers
to disclose automatically certain discovery materials at the beginning of
the lawsuit. The program consisted of two panels. On the first panel Professors Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,' Stephen Subrin,2 and Jeffrey
Stempel3 explored the changes from a variety of perspectives. Their presentations and the discussion that followed raised important questions
about the rules themselves, the rulemaking process, and the extent to
which we have, or need to have, uniform, centrally-created, transubstantive
procedural rules.
Recognizing that the audience, consisting primarily of law school
professors, would want to hear what full-time lawyers and judges thought
of the changes, conference planners asked a second panel of federal judges
and litigators to share their views. Speaking on "The Practical Implications
of Discovery Reform" were Judge William 0. Bertelsman,4 Bill Lann
Lee,5 Judge Barrington Parker, Jr.,6 Judge Norma L. Shapiro,7 and Professor Minna Kotkin.'
The FloridaLaw Review is delighted to present the fruits of that meeting in this symposium issue.9 The symposium issue includes articles elab* Professor, University of Florida, Chair, 1993 American Association of Law Schools Section
on Civil Procedure. The members of the 1993 Civil Procedure section Executive Committee-Janice
Toran, Eric Yamamoto, and Jeffrey Stempel-and Minna Kotkin, 1993 Chair of the AALS Litigation
Section, deserve great thanks for their contributions in planning and organizing the meeting program.
1. Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
2. Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law and Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs.
3. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
4. Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
5. Western Regional Counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
6. Then a partner, Morrison & Foerster, New York City, now a federal district judge for the
Southern District of New York.
7. Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
8. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
9. The full comments of panelists Lee, Parker, and Shapiro are on file with the Florida Law
Review.
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orating on the talks delivered by panelists Dreyfuss, Subrin, and
Bertelsman, as well as articles written by the moderators of the two panels, Stempel and Kotkin, reacting to and expanding upon the panelists'
ideas. A related article by Professor Carl Tobias completes the consideration of Rule reform.' 0
An interesting split occurred among the panelists at the conference.
Although conference planners had expected (and had in fact hoped for) a
divergence of opinion among the panelists, we had not fully anticipated
the fault line that in fact appeared between the first panel and the second
in their assessment of the relative importance of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Let me summarize the panel presentations and then briefly
explore that gap and its possible significance.
THE FIRST PANEL

Several major points emerged from the first panel presentations:
o The automatic disclosure rules, as written, are essentially heading in
the wrong direction. They will add costs in the vast majority of cases in
which there would otherwise have been no discovery, yet do little to facilitate effective discovery in cases calling for discovery.

Our rulemaking process is burdened at both the national and local
levels. In both areas we have too many sources of federal procedural rules,
too many layers of decisionmaking, and too much diffusion of responsibility.
o

Discovery reform requires accurate knowledge about lawyer behavior. To improve the discovery process, we need better sense of the actual
relationship between rules, facts, judicial behavior, and lawyer behavior.
o

The best impetus to fact development is a clear set of rules and a
sure knowledge that judges will be deciding-as opposed to "managing"-cases.
o

o "Transubstantive"

disclosure rules leave too much to judicial discretion. Substance-specific rules that identify exactly what materials must be
automatically disclosed in particular classes of cases will create quicker
and more efficient discovery and restore judges to their proper roles as
judicial decisionmakers.

10. Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L. REv. 127 (1994).
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Rochelle Dreyfuss's article, The What and Why of the New Discovery
Rules," sets up the problem, examining both the impact of the rules and
the process by which they were adopted. If Dreyfuss regards the rules
themselves as problematic, she finds their adoption process even more
troubling. The very existence of the new rules is paradoxical, she argues,
since they run counter to the expressed intention of various statutory plans
to create laboratories for local experimentation in rule development. The
imposition of a national standard for automatic disclosure at this particular
moment contradicts "public choice theory, the reforms of open-government advocates, and the carefully laid plans of legal empiricists." 2
Dreyfuss suggests that the process for federal rule reform is deeply flawed.
Its complex, multi-tiered nature diffuses responsibility in a way that makes
it easier to ignore problems than resolve them. 3 Moreover, we are insisting on judicially-driven rules without really understanding why this is
important, or how the rulemaking process might capture those benefits. 4
Rather than reforming the discovery process, she argues, our next revision
probably should be of the rules process itself. 5
In Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure,6 Steve Subrin shows how faulty
assumptions about judges, lawyers, facts, and rules made in the earliest
version of discovery rules have been preserved and even magnified in the
most recent set of reforms. By adhering to the notion of
transubstantivity-the need to draft provisions for automatic disclosure
flexible enough to cover all cases---our rulemakers have in fact removed
any possibility of meaningful restraint on lawyers, since the vagueness of
a rule designed to fit "all" occasions will leave lawyers with more room to
act adversarially and judges with more opportunities for ad hoc case management. 7 This decrease in the possibility of public adjudication puts one
of our most cherished values-the neutrality of the judicial branch-even
more at risk.'
It is time to see whether procedure can provide more predictable justice, 9 says Subrin. For discovery to work more effectively, he advocates

11. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L. REv. 9
(1994).
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 22-24.
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id.
16. Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Casefor Selective Substance-Specific Procedure,46 FLA. L. REv. 27 (1994).
17. Id. at 43-44.
18. Id. at 44.
19. Id. at 55.
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more certainty in two arenas. In the vast majority of cases, discovery
should be limited and a firm trial date set.2" For the minority of cases
that require more discovery, we should establish explicit, presumptive
substantive-specific rules for disclosure in common categories of cases to
reduce uncertainty, friction, game-playing, and the need for judicial management.2
Jeffrey Stempel, who moderated the first panel, presents his reactions
and responses in Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin's
New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem. ,22 Stempel attempts to put the 1993 amendments into a broader reform perspective, focusing principally on how the self-interest of various
professional groups and a questionable "crisis" mentality interfere with our
ability to engage in healthy procedural reform. He agrees with Subrin that
two of the biggest problems with our litigation system are the steady judicial movement from case adjudication to case management, and the attempt to eliminate problems through "magic bullets" rather than the more
prosaic business of day-by-day adjudication.2 3 These problems are compounded by the fact that federal judges often strongly disagree on the
worth of specific types of discovery, creating a wildly divergent (and
typically unreported) caselaw.24
For Stempel, proper resolution will come through increased open,
public, structured participation by those working in the system or affected
by it.2 5 Despite his own earlier support of transubstantivity, he recognizes
that our current system is "characterized by de facto substance-specific
procedure operating under a smokescreen of transubstantively written Civil
Rules.' 26 He examines Subrin's suggestion of substance-specific procedural rules in detail, concluding that the legal system (specifically, the
ABA) should develop and test the presumptive discovery entitlements
outlined by Subrin. 27 Further rule reform should come through publiclyconstituted rulemaking bodies that consider the good of the entire litigation community. 21

20. Id. at 45.
21. Id. at 46-48.
22. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin 's New-Old Procedure
as a Possible Antidote to Dre)fuss's "Tolstoy Problem, " 46 FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994).

23. Id. at 61. "[Wlhen an adjudicatory system adjudicates," Stempel argues, "settlements will
follow as a matter of course." Id. at 65.
24. See id. at 66.
25. See id. at 89.
26. Id. at 83.
27. Id. part II.C.
28. Id. at 96-97
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THE SECOND PANEL

The second panel was provocative both in what it said and what it did
not say. The four invited panelists-federal judges Norma Shapiro and
William Bertelsman, civil rights litigator Bill Lann Lee, and then-corporate
attorney Barrington Parker, Jr.29 -agreed with some of the earlier criticisms of the rulemaking process itself, emphasizing the problems created
by recent reforms which leave a wide variety of procedural rules potentially applicable in every federal courtroom."0 Paraphrasing an unidentified
member of the British Parliament, Shapiro observed: "Reform, reform,
reform-Enough of reform! It's bad enough already!"'"
On the other hand, all four speakers seemed relatively sanguine about
the impact of the automatic disclosure rules themselves. 2 Based on their
experience, these speakers generally predicted that the new rules will at
worst have minimal impact on litigation in the federal courts. At best, the
new rules may help parties resolve disputes more quickly and effectively.
33
In his article, Changing the Rules of Pretrial Fact Disclosure,
Bertelsman offers evidence to support his belief that the change is beneficial. As a member of the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure,
Bertelsman had serious reservations about the proposed rule, so he applied
the rule in his own courtroom to help him assess its practical impact on
discovery behavior. After a two-year trial he reported that he had encountered none of the problems that he had expected: no one debated what
"with particularity" meant and he did not have a single privilege question.
Bertelsman attributes the success of the disclosure requirement to the fact
that lawyers were required to meet to exchange information with the
knowledge that they would soon have a Rule 16 conference with the
judge. This requirement provided considerable impetus to cooperation.'

29. Judge Parker is now a federal district judge for the Southern District of New York.
30. Tape of Program of Sections on Civil Procedure and Litigation, Recent Changes in the Rules
of Pretrial Fact Development: What Do They Disclose About Litigation and the Legal Profession?
held by the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 7, 1994) (on file with the Florida Law Review) [hereinafter Program Tapes].
31. Id.
32. For a more detailed discussion of the views of those participants whose remarks are not published in this symposium, see Minna J. Kotkin, Discovery in the Real World, 46 FLA. L. REV. 115,
116-18. (1994). Kotkin points out that panelists Lee and Shapiro were not as sanguine about the rules
as the others. Id. at 117-18.
33. William 0. Bertelsman, The 1994 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools: Changing the Rules of PretrialFact Disclosure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 105 (1994).
34. In fact, states adopting similar rules have emphasized that the lawyers' meeting is the significant feature of the rule. See Robert E. Bartkus, New Rules Intended to Reduce Friction, 136 N.J. L.J.
782, 782 (1994) ("Although criticism of the new rules has concentrated on the requirement, set out in
Rule 26(a), that makes the 'disclosure' of certain information automatic early in the case (that is, within 10 days after an initial meeting of the attorneys), the real focus of the changes should be viewed as
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Underpinning the speakers' sense that the disclosure changes were not
terribly important was a more fundamental sense that, in the courtrooms
where they practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply do not
carry much weight. Consider these observations made by three of the
panelists:
Bill Lann Lee: "In the Central District [of California] . .. I would say
for most situations [we] don't even bother reading the federal rules-[we]
just start with the Central District rules. And then each judge has standing
orders.... And then when you show up with your case, you have to find
out if the judge is going to suspend the rule for your particular case or
not. So, what sense are these rules, in a sense that they're [a] guide to
conduct?"35
Barrington Parker, Jr.: "[I'd like to challenge the assumption] that
problems such as discovery abuses, litigation costs, and public disaffection
with our profession are problems that can be made better if our will and
our intellectual effort focuses on developing better rules of conduct and
better rules of practice."36 Instead, he argues, other factors drive change.
In New York corporate litigation, discovery changes have been "clientdriven": "Clients got tired of paying lawyer bills .... You're asked for
budgets. You're asked to justify why you're taking these depositions, what
do you expect to learn, is there any more efficient way of doing it....
[T]here have to be substantial economic incentives to make lawyers
change their behavior .... And that ought to be the driving force behind
rule revision."3
Judge Norma Shapiro: "[I want to speak today] to three propositions.
One, that at the present time all this doesn't make much difference anyway. Two, we should stop changing the rules. For better or worse, they
should stay the way they are for a while. And three, that the problem is
civility and the Rules of Civil Procedure are not designed [to] and cannot
achieve it .... Maybe your students know the Rules of Civil Procedure
when they leave your classrooms, but lawyers, in general, don't .... Most
of the lawyers practice in state court and [they are] surprised when I tell
them that their pleading shouldn't refer to the Pennsylvania rules of civil
procedure; we have other rules.... "38
Shapiro continues: "I don't know whether it's [that] the judges don't

the conference of attorneys-set forth in Rule 26(f)-that must take place at least 14 days before the
initial scheduling conference with, in this district, the magistrate judge assigned to supervise pretrial
matters in the case.").
35. Program Tapes, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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know [the rules] or [ ] they don't care. But no [judge] that I knew thought
rules were as important as Steve Burbank and I did when I became a
judge. I became a judge in 1978, [and] in 1983 we had this mandatory
Rule 16 conference. So I went to my senior colleagues, [and asked] 'What
are you going to do?' And they said, 'Nothing.' s139
Reflecting on the reactions of this group, I find myself wondering how
the academic panelists could get so exercised about something that seems
so insignificant to the distinguished practitioners on the second panel.
Several explanations offer themselves, none entirely sufficient. The point
that I want to make here is this: As different as the attitudes may seem, in
fact what we have is two different descriptions of a single problem. If the
first panelists are correct that we have taken a wrong turn in our attempts
to reform discovery, this is exactly what we might have expected as a
practical reaction-judges and practitioners find that our national efforts at
discovery reform are basically irrelevant to the daily workings of the litigation system.
As both sets of speakers demonstrate, the power and significance of
the national rule reform has been diluted in a variety of ways. In particular, reform is weakened through the proliferation of local rules and standing rules, and through the rulemakers' attempts to be all things to all
people by allowing local districts to opt out of the rules and by framing
the rule requirements in the type of vague language that permits wide
latitude for attorney interpretation and judicial discretion. As Subrin accurately observes, "With current procedural uncertainty under elastic rules,
amended rules, opted out rules, defaults to rules that no longer exist, local
rules, civil justice reform plans, standing orders, new orders, and unpublished orders, perhaps we have pushed chaos theory a bit far."'
We are fortunate that the moderator of the second panel, Minna
Kotkin, has crystallized her reaction to the second set of panelists in Discovery in the Real World!' Her reaction to the rules is markedly less
sanguine than that of those who preceded her. Her experience of the discovery process in a federal employment discrimination clinic is so radically different from the process described by her fellow panelists that she
can only conclude that she practices law in a different world.
In a passage that should be read by every rule reformer and included
in every first-year civil procedure book, Kotkin describes the frustratingly
slow discovery dance that she engages in with defense counsel in almost
every employment discrimination claim she handles. The ritual is maddeningly predictable: while plaintiff turns over information, defense lawyers
39. Id.
40. Subrin, supra note 16, at 56.
41. Kotkin, supra note 32, at 115.
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resist discovery, starting with requests for extensions, followed by objections based on claims of relevance and privilege. "Then begins the
'conferring' process," she writes, "often characterized by phone-tag, promises to 'get back to you,' negotiations about confidentiality orders, claims
of extensive searches for supposedly nonexistent documents, inability to
retrieve information by the category sought, exchanges of letters, and
misunderstandings about agreements reached. What is most striking about
this process is its indeterminacy ....4
The virtual disappearance of written discovery decisions since the
1970s allows defense lawyers to continue their abusive practices: one
recent, local, on point decision would do a great deal to resolve the standard relevancy and privilege disputes that she regularly encounters. 43 For
Kotkin, the movement towards informal ad-hoc resolution of discovery
issues benefits only the defense bar, and mandatory disclosure will do
little to address the problem."
Kotkin's article nicely rounds out this symposium: while her experience provides a provocative contrast to some of the views reflected by
other members of the second panel, she helps flesh out many of the specific concerns raised by the other speakers. If we are to have effective
discovery reform in the future we need to address the fundamental questions posed by these panelists: What are the core values that should be
preserved in the regulation of discovery? Equally important: what mix of
local and national rulemaking and what mix of substance-specific and
substance-blind regulation will do most to further those goals?

42. Id. at 121-22.
43. Id. at 123.
44. See id. at 115-16.
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